This paper investigates the relationship between state ownership and corporate investment policies and empirically tests the underlying theoretical channels of influence. Using a sample of more than 5,000 observations of 312 listed European firms with at least 5% government ownership and a matched sample of always private listed European firms, we find that state ownership is mainly associated with stabilityseeking investment policies and increased levels of capital constraints; theories of overinvestment and soft-budget constraints are not supported. State ownership curtails firms' responsiveness to changes in investment opportunities, even after controlling for endogeneity and measurement errors. With increasing government ownership, investment becomes more sensitive to internal funds when capital constraints and the need for external financing is high. State ownership has a negative direct effect on the level of and the yearly changes in investment, but mitigates capital expenditure cuts during the recent financial crisis. 
Introduction
Despite multiple privatization waves globally since the early 1980s, the state remains an influential shareholder in many of the world's largest companies. In fact, recent years have brought an increase of state involvement in the private sector (Borisova, Fotak, Holland, and Megginson, 2015; Bortoilotti, Fotak, and Megginson, 2015) that is sometimes described by the media as a revival of state intervention (The Economist, 2012) .
1 Against this backdrop, a growing strand of the literature is dedicated to identifying the implications of state ownership regarding firm-specific factors, such as profitability and efficiency. Our focus is on firms' investment policies, which are essential for their future profits and firm value, and have been shown to be related with state ownership (Firth, Malatesta, Xin, and Xu, 2012; Chen, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Wang, 2014) . The core question is, if government owners have an influence on whether firms efficiently invest according to their existing investment opportunities -typically measured by
Tobin's Q -, or whether they over-/underinvest conditional on other financial factors, such as internal funds (Stein, 2003) . As shown by Stein (2003) , the major forces that distort firms' investment policies are agency problems and financing frictions. State ownership can be associated with both issues in various ways, which makes it theoretically unclear if and, more importantly, how having government shareholders affect firms' capital allocation.
For example, owing to imperfect monitoring (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Borisova, Brockman, Salas, and Zagorchev, 2012) and various political motives, government owners may exhibit empire-building investment patterns, wherein managers overinvest available internal funds in pet projects (Jensen, 1986) . On the other hand, state ownership may also give rise to managerial "quiet life"
behavior characterized by investment inertia (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) and political objectives to pursue firm and employee stability (Fogel, Morck, and Yeung, 2008; Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar, 2013) .
This would imply that state ownership negatively affects both the level of investment and its dependence to growth opportunities. . From a financing perspective, as Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, and Cosset (2012) argue, the risk of political interference and agency problems may increase the wedge between internal and external capital costs. This additional financing friction reduces investment by firms requiring external funding. Opposite to this, the soft-budget constraint theory (Kornai, 1979 (Kornai, , 1980 suggests that statecontrolled firms face lower financing constraints because they can obtain external financing more easily 1 For example, the French government held substantial ownership stakes in more than ten of the largest 40 companies listed in the CAC40 as of August 2015 (the list is available at http://www.economie.gouv.fr/agence-participationsetat). Additionally, Megginson and Fotak (2015) report that over the 2001-2013 period governments acquired more assets through stock purchases ($1.52 trillion) than they sold through share issue privatizations and direct sales ($1.48 trillion).
than privately controlled firms, owing to their implicit guarantee of government bailout (Borisova and Megginson, 2011; Ben-Nasr et al., 2012) .
To disentangle these conflicting theoretical predictions about state ownership effects, we employ an empirical testing approach. Based on a simplified model of investment in the spirit of Stein (2003) that captures agency issues and capital constraints in an intuitive way, we derive testable predictions of the different theoretical arguments relating to state ownership. The resulting predictions focus on the influence of government ownership on the level of investment and its sensitivity to investment opportunities, measured by Tobin's Q, and to internal funds. We apply this testing scheme to a panel dataset of publicly listed firms in Europe covering the period 1997-2013. Using an algorithmic approach to combine various sources of ownership information, we are able to precisely identify government shareholdings above the 5% threshold. Our final sample includes more than 5,000 observations of 312 firms with significant state ownership in any of the years, and the same number of non-state-owned firms that are matched based on size, industry affiliation and country groups.
Our primary findings are threefold: First, our evidence shows that state ownership curtails the sensitivity of investment to Tobin's Q. This also holds true when we consider alternative measures of investment opportunities that are not directly related to the firm's stock price, or when we use advanced estimation methods to control for measurement error in Q. Second, investment-cash flow sensitivity (ICFS) increases with the level of state ownership if, and only if, firms are presumably financially constrained and external finance dependent. We also find that this relation particularly prevails countries where the government has no or low ownership of domestic bank assets. Third, our insights show that government ownership has a negative direct effect on the level of investment and on absolute annual investment changes. It also mitigates capital expenditure cuts during the recent global financial crisis. To ensure that these insights are not prone to endogeneity or measurement error, we additionally implement instrumental variables, dynamic system GMM models (Blundell, Bond, Devereux, and Schiantarelli, 1992; Blundell and Bond, 1998) , and higher-order cumulant estimators developed by Erickson and Whited (2000) and Erickson, Jiang, and Whited (2014) . We also rule out alternative explanations for the identified relationship between state ownership and investment. Specifically, we control for the influence of stock price informativeness (Chen et al., 2007) , asset tangibility (Almeida and Campello, 2007) , and uncertainty levels (Boubakri et al., 2013) .
Our insights confirm the general notion that state ownership is associated with inferior investment efficiency, as evidenced by its strongly negative effect on investment-Q sensitivity. The underlying mechanism for this suggests that government shareholders promote investment policies that are best characterized as conservative and stability-seeking. State-owned firms invest less and are lethargic when it comes to adjusting capital expenditures to emerging opportunities. Government stock ownership also seems to constitute a source of financial friction, due to state shareholders' reluctance to allow companies to execute dilutive external equity issues, which makes equity-dependent firms' investment highly reliant on available internal funds.
These novel insights contribute to the literature that speaks to the real effects of state ownership on corporate investment. The popular view that state-owned firms are inefficient because they overspend funds for non-value maximizing purposes does not hold in our data. According to this argument, we would expect a positive link between government ownership and average investment levels, as well as an unconditionally positive link between investment and cash flow. 2 Our evidence also refutes the argument that state ownership has a mitigating effect on firms' financial constraints. Instead, we find that state shareholders can be burdensome for firms that are in need of new capital. This study's findings offer important policy implications. While it is widely accepted that state ownership may not be optimal from a firm value maximization point of view, a popular argument in favor of it says that it serves common goals, such as economic growth and employment. Our findings cast some doubt on the validity of this argument, since government owners seem to reduce firm-level investment as well as employee growth. This is in line with Fogel et al. (2008) , who find that aggregate corporate stability 3 , which is positively correlated with the degree of state intervention, is negatively related to economic growth.
Our paper also sheds light on the general empirical investment literature, which still puzzles over why investment decisions are less sensitive to investment opportunities than the neoclassical q theory predicts. We highlight how decision makers' stability seeking and conservatism can weaken investment sensitivity. Although Kaplan and Zingales (2000) recognize that investment-cash flow sensitivities can be influenced by managerial conservatism, related studies have largely focused on the empire-building type of agency conflicts and financing frictions to explain firms ' investment patterns. 4 This article is related to the studies by Chen, Sun, Tang, and Wu (2011) and Chen et al. (2014) .
Both studies suggest that state ownership negatively affects the sensitivity of investment to Tobin's Q, which serves as a proxy for investment opportunities. Our work goes beyond their findings in that it employs a comprehensive testing scheme -capturing also the level of investment and its sensitivity to cash flow -that allows to disentangle the theoretical channels of state owner influence. We additionally rule out the possibility that the results are driven by varying degrees of stock price informativeness (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007; Ben-Nasr and Cosset, 2014) or measurement issues with Tobin's Q (Erickson and Whited, 2000) . In another article, Firth et al. (2012) find that government ownership causes firms to overinvest, especially when investment opportunities are scarce and internal funds are abundant. On the other hand, Chen, Jiang, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2015) show that internal capital market allocations are more efficient in privately owned business groups in China-where capital is funneled to the best investment opportunities-than in state-owned enterprises, which do the opposite.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework, which features our applied model of investment and the different theoretical arguments related to state ownership. Section 3 describes the data and our primary empirical estimation methods. Section 4 provides and interprets our main results and presents additional robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Framework
The fundamental assumption underlying this study is that companies operate in imperfect markets, where agency problems as well as financial frictions influence the amount of capital that firms allocate to investment projects. To illustrate the theoretical effects of state ownership on corporate investment, we first introduce a heuristic model of investment that captures agency issues and financial frictions in a general and intuitive way. In the second step, we discuss various relevant arguments associated with government ownership and hypothesize how they are related to firms' investment decisions outlined in step one. This yields a set of testable predications about the impact of state ownership on the level of investment, and its sensitivity to investment opportunities and internal funds, respectively.
Investment model
In the spirit of Stein (2003) , we define the value of the firm as:
where ( ) is the firm's operating profit function, is the risk-adjusted discount rate, is investment, and ( ) represents the cost of capital adjustment that occurs at the time of investment. To capture agency problems and managerial biases, we follow Stein (2003) and Aggarwal and Samwick (2006) and augment the objective function with ( ), which reflects the additional value of investment perceived by decision makers. We also include a term for the deadweight cost associated with raising funds externally, given by ( ), where (•) is an increasing convex function, is the amount of external financing, and is the degree of financial constraints. is defined as + ( ) − , where reflects the amount of available internal funds. 5 The first-order condition for maximizing with respect to investment leads to the following specification:
In the absence of agency issues and financial constraints, the left-hand side of equation (2) represents the marginal profit of investment, also defined as marginal , and investment is chosen so that = 1 + ( ).
According to the neoclassical model of investment, outlined by Hayashi (1982) , capital expenditures closely and exclusively follow changes in q, which is the standard measure for a firm's investment opportunities.
If agency conflicts prevail and ≠ 0, firm investment deviates from the perfect-market optimum and is chosen so that = 1 + ( ) − /(1 + ). Firms either over-or underinvest, depending on the sign of , implying that the investment-q relationship / is distorted. The exact relationship between and / depends on the functional forms of ( ), ( ), ( ), and / . We refrain from choosing explicit specifications for these functions, but follow the related literature (Jiang, Kim, and Pang, 2011; Chen et al., 2014; Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist, 2015) in assuming that agency issues ( ≠ 0)
generally lead to reduced investment-q sensitivity ( / ). The Appendix provides a simple proof based on some straightforward assumptions.
In the presence of financial frictions, the optimal investment decision is = (1 + ( ))(1 + ( )). This implies that firms invest less than at the perfect-market optimum -equilibrium q is higher than in the frictionless setting -because the first term on the right-hand side of the equation is larger than one. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) show that, in this situation, investment depends on available internal funds because they ultimately determine external finance requirements, so / > 0. It is crucial to note, however, that positive investment-cash flow sensitivity ( / ) does not prove the existence of financial constraints per se. As Bond and van Reenen (2007) point out, it is in fact a "joint test of all the maintained assumptions of the model, and not simply the assumption of no financing constraints" (p. 4464). 6 Further, it is questionable whether ICFS necessarily reflects the severity of capital constraints. Theoretically, Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) argue that this ultimately depends on assumptions about the firm's production function, in particular linearly decreasing returns to scale. Moyen (2004) and Hennessy and Whited (2007) support this argument and show that, in dynamic settings, less constrained firms may exhibit higher ICFS primarily because they react less aggressively to changes in investment opportunities, which are correlated with cash flows. 7 To account for these circumstances, we design an empirical strategy (Section 3.5) that accounts for endogeneity of cash flows and imperfect measurement of q. Also, any interpretation of cash flow coefficients is carefully differentiated based on characteristics that indicate the degree of ex-ante external finance dependence.
If and how financial constraints affect the sensitivity of investment to q is not a trivial question. On the one hand, financial frictions distort this relation because capital-constrained firms' ability to increase investment with rising opportunities is limited. This argument is rooted in the neoclassical investment model described by Hayashi (1982) and supported by findings of Hennessy and Whited (2007) and McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2012) . On the other hand, changes in q may themselves affect the degree of financial constraints because better growth opportunities could ease existing frictions and provide an additional trigger to investment responses (Chen et al., 2007) . This effect is even more pronounced when measures of investment opportunities are subject to market failures and investor sentiment (Baker, Stein, and Wurgler, 2003) .
State ownership and investment: theoretical channels of influence
Theoretically, state ownership can influence firms' investment policies, formalized above, in various ways. In this section, we outline the major relevant theoretical arguments and organize them according to their association with agency aspects (reflected in ) and financing frictions (reflected in ).
Thereby, we are able to link the theoretical channels of government influence with the above model, and derive testable to predictions that help us to disentangle the real impact of state ownership on investment.
Empire-building and overinvestment
The first argument posits that state ownership is systematically related to decision makers' empirebuilding motives and overinvesting activities (Chen et al., 2011; Firth et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2014) . This theoretical argument supposes that decision makers have a particular interest in running large firms, as opposed to solely profitable ones. This idea goes back to the agency cost of free cash flow, introduced by Jensen (1986) , according to which managers spend available internal funds on investment projects to grow the firm beyond its optimal size in order to increase power and potentially compensation. Dow, Gorton, and
Krishnamurthy (2005) and Albuquerque and Wang (2008) show that ownership and control characteristics determine how agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, and among shareholders, lead to investment policies that are driven by empire-building motives.
State ownership may be positively related to empire-building and overinvestment for at least two reasons. First, from a managerial perspective, state ownership is associated with weak monitoring of 7 Nevertheless, numerous studies have followed Fazzari et al. (1988) and utilized ICFS as a measure for financial constraints, and to date, the debate about proper interpretation is still ongoing (Almeida and Campello, 2007; Chen and Chen, 2012; Agca and Mozumdar, 2014; Lewellen and Lewellen, 2014) .
managers (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; Laffont and Tirole, 1993) . Related to this, Borisova et al. (2012) show that government control is negatively related to corporate governance quality. Moreover, stateowned firms are frequently less exposed to external disciplining forces, such as product market competition or takeover pressures (Chen et al., 2014) . Second, from a political perspective, the state as a major shareholder may have objectives that evoke overinvestment. Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) suggest that governments would be willing and able to subsidize inefficiently high output in order to maximize employment or achieve other socially desirable goals, such as locating production capacities in economically underdeveloped but politically important regions, providing cheap goods and services, and producing unnecessary products (Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar, 2008) . As Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh (1994) argue, all of this would imply that state-owned firms tend to invest relatively more than firms without state involvement. Similarly, Firth et al. (2012) contend that maximizing government owners' "objective functions may entail expanding production capacity even if profitable investment opportunities are scarce. Hence, government controlled firms would use available cash flows to expand investment even if profitability is reduced" (p. 436).
The implication is that the marginal additional value of investment is positive (BI > 0), which constitutes a distortion to the investment-q relationship. Further, as Jensen (1986) , Stulz (1990) , and Stein (2003) argue, BI strongly depends on the availability of internal funds (∂BI/∂W > 0). In consequence, investment increases with available internal funds, as evidenced by Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994) and Andrén and Jankensgard (2015) . Under the assumption that state ownership is positively associated with the described agency problems, this argument leads to following predictions: 
Stability and the quiet life
Contrary to the previous argument, an alternative agency problem suggests that decision makers prefer the "quiet life" and are prone to inertia when it comes to making major investment decisions. This theory goes back to a study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) , who examine the adoption of antitakeover laws in US states to empirically test managerial preferences. One of the major findings is that insulation from takeovers reduces closures of old plants, but also inhibits the creation of new plants. of the major arguments is that corporate stability "is a tool for stabilizing employment and promoting egalitarian goals" (Fogel et al., 2008, p. 96) . Similar to the quest for a "quiet life", this pursuit of stability implies reluctance to downsize investment and employment when economically needed, and conservatism to undertake capacious investments when opportunities are plentiful. Related to this, John, Litov, and
Yeung (2008) argue that governments may discourage risky investment activities in order to maintain a constant base for rent extraction. Boubakri et al. (2013) show that, in the context of privatizations, state ownership is negatively related to risky investment decisions. The authors attribute this at least partly to the state owners' high risk aversion and the corresponding incentive structures, which impede risky investment projects. In an early study on privatization, Megginson et al. (1994) show that state-owned firms rather underinvest, partially because state control limits corporate entrepreneurship.
The corresponding model assumption related to this theoretical argument is that BI < 0, meaning there is an additional perceived cost of marginal investment. Based on the findings by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) , it is also fair to assume that decision makers dislike strong positive and negative investment adjustments and rather prefer stable levels over time. This implies that / |Δ | < 0. Under the assumption that state ownership is positively linked to quiet-life agency problems, this theoretical argument leads to the following testable predictions: Megginson, 2011; Borisova et al., 2015) . Prior research shows that government ownership is also associated with inferior reporting quality and financial transparency (Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2004; Guedhami, Pittman, and Saffar, 2009 ). This leads to greater information asymmetries and higher costs of external finance.
Moreover, the very nature of the state as a major shareholder could create a source of financial friction for the company. Megginson et al. (1994) note that governments run their state-owned firms on a tight cash budget in order to exercise some form of control and to limit public borrowing requirements.
One might expect a rent-seeking government shareholder that requires payouts to manage public budgets not to be particularly keen on injecting additional capital to fund corporate investments, even if these are 
Soft-budget constraints
It is also conceivable that state ownership reduces the wedge between external and internal finance costs. Based on the soft-budget constraint theory, initiated by Kornai (1979 Kornai ( , 1980 and summarized by Firth et al. (2012) and Megginson, Ullah, and Wei (2014) , state-controlled firms are able to obtain external financing more easily than privately controlled firms. Several studies including Guariglia, Liu, and Song showing that state-owned firms' investment activities are rather insensitive to internally generated funds.
State ownership also reduces the risk of bankruptcy because it carries an implicit guarantee of government bailout. In fact, Borisova and Megginson (2011) and Ben-Nasr et al. (2012) find evidence that, under certain conditions, state ownership can lead to reduced costs of both equity and debt.
State ownership is strongly linked to firms' political connections (Boubakri et al., 2008) , which may be influential for the cost of external financing. For example, Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) show that politically connected companies are more likely to be bailed out than peers without political connections. Moreover, Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008) find evidence that politically connected firms benefit from preferential access to external finance. In consequence, investment policies of politically connected firms depend less on the availability of internal funds, as evidenced by Xu, Xu, and Yuan (2013 
Sample
In order to investigate the effect of state ownership on firms' investment patterns, we study a sample of publicly listed companies incorporated in Europe between 1997 and 2013. We only include listed firms because the required accounting, stock market, and ownership information is obtainable for those firms only. Our rationale for focusing on Europe is similar to that of Borisova and Megginson (2011) and Borisova et al. (2012) . First, significant state holdings in listed firms are common in many European economies, so including several countries allows us to gain the scale that is needed to draw powerful inference from the analyses. Second, we focus on this region to limit the degree of heterogeneity across countries. Extending the dataset to include emerging economies would impede clear economic interpretation as the underlying objectives associated with state ownership may be fundamentally different in those countries. Third, data availability and, more importantly, data quality is particularly high in European countries. Our analysis demands reliable accounting data and accurate information on direct and ultimate state ownership, which is best obtained for European firms. Our panel starts in 1997 because this is the first year for which we are able to gather our key ownership data.
In a first step, we identify listed firms in Europe that are covered in Thomson Worldscope during our sample period. We exclude financial firms as well as observations for which basic accounting datatotal assets, sales, capital expenditure or total equity -is missing. Following Chen and Chen (2012), we exclude firm years in which total asset growth exceeds 100% and capital, total assets and sales are below USD 1 million to mitigate the effect of outliers. Note that we require at least three consecutive years of information to construct lags and still have at least two panel years of complete data. Eventually, we exclude countries with less than 100 observations, which leaves us with 45,553 firm years in 19 countries.
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Next, we match this preliminary sample with our principal ownership dataset, gathered from the Thomson Reuters Ownership database. We are able to collect useful ownership data for 40,075
observations. As described in the following section, we identify firms with significant state ownership in any of the years through an algorithmic approach, which utilizes information from various sources of ownership data.
Definition of state ownership
State ownership may broadly refer to stockholdings by any type of government-owned or controlled entity, including shareholdings of national government ministries and central banks; equity stakes held by state-owned financial and non-financial enterprises; stockholdings of local and regional governments; and portfolio investment holdings by public pension funds and sovereign wealth funds, which are frequently controlled by foreign governments (Borisova, Fotak, Holland, and Megginson, 2013) .
The bulk of the theoretical and empirical literature examining state ownership focuses on domestic government-controlled entities (e.g., Borisova and Megginson, 2011; Chen et al., 2014) , which are also most relevant with respect to the theoretical arguments outlined above. Public pension funds and sovereign wealth funds are assumed to act rather independently and to share many features with institutional investors (Kotter and Lel, 2011; Bortolotti et al., 2015) . Hence, we apply a narrow definition of state ownership that is confined to government-related entities and excludes shareholdings by sovereign wealth and public pension funds. More precisely, entities we deem government-related include central and regional governments (treasuries, ministries, states, municipalities), domestic government-controlled investment funds (such as Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations in France) and financial institutions (e.g., government development banks), and state-controlled non-financial enterprises. This classification logic resembles the approach taken in Borisova et al. (2013) .
State ownership data
Our primary sources of state ownership data are from the Thomson Reuters Ownership & Profiles Database, and include yearly information on ownership shares by a firm's 20 largest shareholders. It also features supplementary information about shareholder type and country, which allow us to identify state owners and discriminate between government agencies, sovereign wealth funds, and public pension funds.
Although data coverage and granularity are satisfactory, data quality is limited, especially when it comes to shareholder type classification. One reason for this is that the data only captures direct shareholdings, which do not necessarily reflect the true ultimate ownership structure. 9 Therefore, we enrich our data with information from Bureau van Dijk's Osiris database, Thomson Reuters' SDC Platinum M&A database, the Privatization Barometer database, and public information from company filings and government institutions such as the ministry of finance. In order to identify firms in which the state holds a significant stake, we employ a three-stage algorithmic approach:
• Step 1: We extend our dataset by matching the firms in our sample with those in the respective databases. From Osiris, we draw information about direct and ultimate shareholdings since 2001;
from SDC Platinum's deal data, we obtain information on whether the respective sample firm was involved in an acquisition by a government-owned entity or in the privatization of government assets 10 ; from the Privatization Barometer, we obtain information on whether and when a sample firm was privatized. Based on this, we flag firms that are presumably state-owned in a specific year according to any of these sources.
•
Step 2: Many governments manage their shareholdings via specific investment vehicles. Thus, we generate a list of 20 of these entities, based on press research and information provided by respective government institutions. We screen all sample firms' shareholders for any of these names and automatically change the shareholder type if necessary. Our name screen also includes basic terms related to state owners such as "Municipality" or "Ministry".
Step 3: In a final step, we manually validate the ownership data of all firms, for which one of the sources indicates state ownership at the 5% level in any of the years by comparing the various sources, and by considering company filings in case of ambiguous data.
These steps yield a sample of 312 firms in which the state holds at least 5% of the shares outstanding in any of the years between 1997 and 2013. The number of firm-years with more than 5 % state ownership amounts to 1,946, which represents about 5% of the full sample of all European firm-years. Owing to the described ownership data-gathering process, our sample covers significantly more state-owned firms in
Europe, compared to the datasets used by Borisova et al. (2012) and Boubakri et al. (2013) , which include 113 and 134 state-owned firms, respectively.
Matching procedure
We match state-owned to non-state-owned firms to identify companies that are observably similar on dimensions likely to affect investment. We follow Mortal and Reisel (2013) and Asker et al. (2015) and focus on firm size and industry, and additionally address legal country groups. Of course, other observable characteristics -such as profitability, cash holdings or leverage -may significantly differ between stateand non-state-owned firms. But our aim is to keep the procedure simple so that we are able to compare both firm types across various characteristics in the course of our analysis, where we also employ instrumental variable models to control for differences between state-and non-state firms across multiple dimensions.
As can be seen from (2000) and McLean et al. (2012) , documents how legal origin affects firms' investment policies and efficiency.
We use a nearest-neighbor matching algorithm adapted to a panel setting. In order to uphold the panel structure, we match on the firm, not the firm year, level. This allows us to capture the time-series variation in state ownership as we do not exclude a firm from our sample once the state relinquishes its ownership stake. In effect, we match firms with at least one year of state ownership above 5% to other firms that are closest in terms of total assets (calculated as the average over the respective sample period) and that are in the same Fama and French 12-industry portfolio and of common legal country origin. 11 We distinguish between common law, French, German, and Scandinavian law origins (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; La Porta et al., 2008 
Empirical specification and variables
We follow the standard approach in the literature based on Fazzari et al. (1988) 
where is investment deflated by beginning-of-period capital. Our default measure for investment is capital expenditures and for capital is net property, plant and equipment. Given that our sample is not limited to manufacturing firms, we consider broader measures for that capture R&D expenses, acquisitions, and changes in total non-current assets in robustness checks. Our default measure of q is Tobin's , calculated as the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. The market value of assets is total assets plus total market capitalization minus book equity. Book value of assets equals total assets.
is operating cash flow scaled by beginning-of-period capital. State is the ownership share held by the state. is the set of additional control variables used in the regression. We follow Chang et al.
(2014) and often include cash, leverage and a measure of firm size in our regressions. We also account for the first-order effect of uncertainty on investment, which has been recently emphasized by Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) and Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2014) . The exact definition and construction of all variables can be found in Appendix A. Our data contains a few severe outliers, such as observations of cash flow that are more than 30 standard deviations away from the mean. To ensure that these outliers do not contaminate our results, we winsorize all variables at the top and bottom 1%. Chen et al., 2011; Firth et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2014) and gives us more flexibility in slicing the data to perform specific analyses on subsamples of firms. Where relevant, we also include interactions of country and industry dummies with and to additionally control for cross-country and -industry heterogeneity in investment sensitivities.
An alternative approach is to remove all cross-sectional differences by only considering the time variation in the state ownership variable. Effectively, this implies estimating equation (3) on the subsample of firms that exhibit significant changes in state ownership over time. Because (government) ownership is typically stable over time, identifying the effect only from time-series variation within firms is not our primary approach. 52% of the 312 state firms experience changes in government control at the 5% ownership threshold, and 39% of them do so at the 10% ownership threshold. Focusing on this subgroup of state firms also poses the risk of running into sample selection problems, as these firms could systematically differ from the other state firms. Nevertheless, we apply this approach as an additional robustness check in Section 4.2.
In addition, to address the various challenges that come with the estimation of investment equations (Section 2.1), we validate our baseline results by applying a battery of complementary analyses.
We discuss these robustness tests, which involve alternative estimation techniques that control for endogeneity of financial variables and measurement error in , in Section 4.2.1.
Results

State ownership and investment
This section presents results from empirical analyses aimed at identifying the channels through which state ownership affects firm investment by testing the predictions formulated in Section 2.2. (2012), and Erickson and Whited (2012) . 12 In fact, our coefficient on is rather high and the one on relatively low compared to studies that cover a broader time frame. This is not surprising as several studies -including Agca and Mozumdar (2008) and
Sensitivity of investment to Q and cash flow
Chen and Chen (2012) -find that ICFS has been decreasing over recent decades. Our estimates are also similar to those obtained from advanced estimation techniques applied in studies by Almeida et al. (2010) and Agca and Mozumdar (2014) . This suggests that our FE coefficients may be only marginally affected by measurement issues with or endogeneity. Nonetheless, we address these issues in Section 4.2.1. Table 4 about here ****
**** Insert
Investment sensitivities and financial constraints
As argued above, interpreting ICFS is not straightforward. It can be the result of both agencyrelated empire-building (Prediction 1b) and increased capital constraints (Prediction 3a). To distinguish between the theoretical arguments, we split the sample on the basis of ex-ante financial constraints and the level of external finance dependence. We follow standard procedures in the literature and proxy the degree of constraints with the Whited-Wu index (Whited and Wu, 2006) , the payout ratio, and a size indicator.
Similar to Rauh (2006) , we proxy a firm's dependence on external finance by the fraction of years for which its capital expenditures are greater than is operating cash flow. Companies whose investment is frequently above their cash flow are more dependent of external funding. Note that in Table 5 , columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 refer to the firms that are presumably more constrained and more dependent on external financing -meaning those with a high Whited-Wu index, a low payout ratio, a small size, and high external finance dependence.
The results displayed in Table 5 14 To enrich the analysis, we consider the influence of government ownership among banks.
Assuming that state ownership in the domestic banking sector is positively correlated with external finance access of state-owned non-financial companies, Proposition 3a suggests that the positive relation between state ownership and capital constraints is particularly present in countries with no or limited government ownership of banks. Hence, we partition our sample into countries with a high and low fraction of government-owned bank assets and estimate equation (3) for both subsamples. The data on state-owned bank assets comes from World Bank survey data used in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2013). The corresponding results in Table 6 show that the significantly positive coefficient on × State only exists in firms from countries with low government ownership in banks. This finding supports Proposition 3a that state ownership is associated with increased external finance frictions. It also shows that this adverse effect seems to be mitigated when a large fraction of the banking sector is also controlled by the state.
**** Insert Table 6 about here ****
Direct effect of state ownership on investment
To validate the above insights, we investigate the direct effect of state ownership on the level of investment in cross-sectional analyses. Table 7 presents the results of estimating a slightly modified equation (3), in which the respective interaction terms are excluded and additional controls for dividend payments are included. We do not include firm fixed effects in these regressions to fully capture the effect of state ownership, which exhibits only a limited degree of time-variation that is captured in FE models.
Instead, the regressions now include country and industry fixed effects, which were previously absorbed by the firm fixed effects.
Overall, these results paint a clear picture. In line with the stability argument outlined in Section 2.2.2, estimates show that state ownership is associated with lower investment ratios, ceteris paribus. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level, or 5% level with additional controls, but is not very large in economic terms. It is also relatively unaffected by the respective level of financial constraints and external finance dependence, as the results for the subsamples indicate. Table 7 about here **** State ownership also implies more investment stability, which is demonstrated by the negative coefficients in row 11, where the absolute change in investment is the dependent variable. Through probit regressions in rows 12 and following, we find that this stability manifests itself as a particularly lower likelihood of state-owned firms cutting investments. State ownership is also negatively related to strong annual increases in investment (last row).
**** Insert
These findings are not in line with the concept of overinvestment. In fact, our evidence is rather in line with early findings by Megginson et al. (1994) , who document that divested firms increase capital investment spending after privatization, and reminds us of the quiet life behavior identified by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) . This support for Predictions 2b and 2c suggests that, overall, the influence of state ownership on corporate investment can best be explained by the agency-related stability argument, paired with the notion of increased capital constraints.
Investment reductions during the financial crisis
We next analyze how state ownership is related to the investment reductions undertaken during Explaining these patterns is not trivial as it is still controversial whether the crisis constitutes a shock to firms' credit supply and bank lending or to their product demand and uncertainty levels, or both (Kahle and Stulz, 2013). While we are not able to preclude any of the crisis theories, our major interpretation of the dynamics presented in Figure 1 is that state-owned firms are more reluctant and hesitant to downsize investment in light of an external demand and/or uncertainty shock. Overall, this supports the notion that state ownership has a mitigating effect on crisis-related investment cuts, and that this effect is mainly due to state-owned firms' reluctance to quickly adjust investment levels to sudden changes in growth outlooks and uncertainty levels.
The results also reveal that investment changes in the first year of the crisis are negatively related to pre-crisis leverage ratios (column 1 and 2). This may be due to highly levered firms' impaired access to debt financing or their precautionary capital structure adoptions in times of uncertain credit supply conditions. 14 **** Insert Table 8 about here ****
Complementary tests
In this section, we present additional evidence that validates our previous findings and enriches our understanding of state-owned firms' investment patterns.
Tests of endogeneity concerns
To test whether our results are substantially affected by endogeneity issues related to state ownership and the financial variables (e.g., cash flow), or by imperfect measurement of investment opportunities, we apply instrumental variables models and advanced techniques to estimate equation (3). Table 9 presents the associated regression results. **** Insert Table 9 about here ****
In Panel A, we address the potential endogeneity of State. While it seems unlikely that the governments' decision to hold ownership stakes is reversely caused by the sensitivities of investment to q and cash flow, it is possible that state ownership is correlated with omitted factors that influence the relation between investment and q and cash flow (Firth et al., 2012 To account for potential endogeneity of financial variables and the dynamic nature of investment decisions, we additionally employ system GMM models in the spirit of Blundell et al. (1992) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . Recent studies by Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) and Flannery and Hankins (2013) compare various estimation methods for dynamic panel models and show that system GMM yields estimates that are generally more accurate (and efficient) than those by difference GMM or traditional OLS and FE estimators, when explanatory variables are endogenous. 15 FE models are particularly weak in estimating the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (Flannery and Hankins, 2013) . Almeida et al.
(2010) specifically consider investment equations and show that instrumental variable approaches, such as difference and system GMM, yield robust estimates. 15 This dynamic panel method uses past realizations of explanatory variables as instruments and estimates model coefficients based on GMM. It is particularly suitable for investment equations due to their dynamic nature (Bond and van Reenen, 2007) . In fact, system GMM performs a two-equation regression, one in first differences and one in levels, with lagged variables used as instruments both in levels and differences. Taking this approach helps to overcome the weak instruments problem inherent in the traditional first difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995) . Other studies using difference or system GMM models to estimate investment equations include Cummins, Hassett, and Oliner (2006), Carpenter and Guariglia (2008) , Brown and Petersen (2009) , and Agca and Mozumdar (2014).
Our implementation uses variables from t − 3 as instruments for the equations in differences and one lag for those in levels as suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998 (2006) and Almeida et al. (2010) and use longer lags to account for potential endogeneity and measurement error in Q. Finally, we do not include multiple lags to limit the size of our instrument matrix and to mitigate the well-known problem of too many instruments (Roodman, 2009) . Nevertheless, our results remain virtually unchanged when we include more lags as instruments.
The GMM models in columns 1 and 2 yield coefficients on the interaction terms that are closely in line with our previous findings. They also provide plausible estimators that conform with theoretical expectations. The cash flow coefficient decreases and the Q coefficient increases compared to OLS and FE estimations of the dynamic equation. 16 The coefficient on lagged investment also seems reasonable according to Blundell et al. (1992) , as it lies between the coefficients from an OLS model (0.52) and from a FE model (0.26). The Hansen statistics in column 1 and 2 do not reject the hypothesis of valid instruments.
Finally, we experiment with higher-order cumulant estimators developed by Erickson et al. (2014) to explicitly address the well-known problem that average Tobin's Q is an imperfect measure of unobservable marginal q. Erickson and Whited (2000) show that in the presence of mis-measured investment opportunities, cash flow has explanatory power because it contains information about investment opportunities. The authors propose a modified GMM estimator based on higher order moment conditions, which is explicitly described in their article. Recently, Erickson et al. (2014) developed a similar yet slightly more convenient estimator based on equations that are linear in the third-and higherorder cumulants of the joint distribution of the observable variables. The cumulants are polynomial functions of the same moments that are used in Erickson and Whited (2000) and are thus asymptotically equivalent, yet the cumulant estimators exhibit superior finite-sample performance and feature a closedform solution. This is a huge advantage as it eliminates manual selection of starting values (for the mismeasured coefficient), which strongly influence the quality of moment estimators and limit practical application. In implementing this estimator, we use cumulants up to the fourth order as this specification proves most robust in sensitivity checks. We estimate equations both in levels and differences to absorb the firm-specific heterogeneity.
17
16 In an unreported variation of model 1, with lagged I as a variable, the coefficient on is 0.039 and 0.055 on . 17 We thank the authors for providing the Stata code.
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The results from these estimations, presented in columns 3 and 4, strengthen our previous findings by producing highly negative estimates on × State and positive but insignificant estimates on × State. As expected, the coefficients on and its interaction term with state ownership increase in magnitude, which "stems from the attenuation bias in the OLS estimate" (Erickson et al., 2014, p.219) .
The cash flow coefficient slightly decreases but remains statistically significant at the 1% level. In unreported regressions, we estimate models 5 and 6 with calculated as in Erickson and Whited (2012) and find a coefficient between 0.015 and 0.016, which is very close to those reported by Erickson and Whited (2012) .
Tests of alternative explanations
To ensure that the findings in Table 4 are not driven by alternative explanations for the relation between state ownership and investment sensitivities, we perform supplementary tests in Table 10 . First, our inference could be substantially undermined if the quality of a stock market-based measure of q is negatively related to state ownership. In a recent article, Ben-Nasr and Cosset (2014) find that state ownership is associated with lower stock price informativeness, which is relevant for the investmentrelation (Chen et al., 2007) . From a more theoretical perspective, Hayashi (1982) shows that constant returns to scale and perfect competition are necessary conditions for measured average to equal unobservable marginal q. Thinking about the market environment in which state-owned firms typically operate, it seems possible that state ownership is associated with higher market power, which could in turn lead to an increased wedge between marginal q and average . Therefore, we test if our results change when we use alternative investment opportunity measures that are not linked to firms' stock prices (columns 1 to 3). Similar to Asker et al. (2015) , we use sales growth as well as an industry-level measure of and a predicted . We calculate Industry as the total assetsweighted average in each two-digit SIC industry and year based on the unmatched sample. Predicted is estimated similarly to Campello and Graham (2013), Mortal and Reisel (2013) , and Asker et al. (2015) with a regression (run on the unmatched sample) of on a list of fundamentals that are detailed in Appendix A. The results presented in the first three columns strongly support our previous findings and suggest that they are not driven by stock market factors. In unreported regressions, we split the sample into firms that are presumably constrained and unconstrained, and find that the positive coefficient on × State only refers to highly constrained firms, in line with the results from Table 5 . **** Insert Table 10 about here **** We also follow Chen et al. (2007) and Jiang et al. (2011) and include a measure of stock price informativeness ( ) as well as its interaction with in the specification presented in column 4. Despite the fact that is on average lower for state-vs. non-state-owned firms (Table 3) , our results are not significantly affected by this, as shown in column 3. As expected, the coefficient on the interaction term of and is positive. Column 5 addresses the possibility that the relation between investment sensitivities and state ownership could be driven by differences in asset tangibility, which is shown to be influential for ICFS (Almeida and Campello, 2007) . The estimated equation includes a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm's tangibility, measured as the ratio of PPE over total assets (Chang et al., 2014) , is above the yearly sample median, and its interaction terms with and . Although ICFS increases with asset tangibility, our coefficients of interest related to state ownership do not change significantly.
Finally, we check whether our results simply reflect different risk attitudes and uncertainty levels between state-and non-state-owned firms. This test is motivated by Boubakri et al. (2013) , who show that state ownership negatively affects corporate risk taking. In column (6), we include a dummy variable that equals one if Volatility is above the annual sample median, and the respective interaction terms with and . Interestingly, we find evidence that investment-q sensitivity is higher and ICFS is lower for firms with stronger uncertainty levels. However, this does not explain the influence of state ownership on investment patterns. Note that this does not change if we use a fundamental measure of risk taking such as past earnings volatility.
Alternative sampling and matching approaches
Although our sample comprises a relatively homogeneous group of countries, we are aware that the implications of state ownership for corporate investment behavior might still differ between countries and regions. For example, the evidence presented in Table 6 shows that the nature of the domestic banking landscape has an impact on the relation between state ownership and external finance access. To rule out the possibility that our findings represent single country-or region-specific phenomena and not the dominant state ownership effect across European firms, we check whether our findings are robust to using alternative country sets. Specifically, we exclude observations from France, which is overrepresented in our sample (accounts for more than 20% of the observations), and from Eastern European countries, which are arguably most different in terms of economic, political, and social environment.
Panel A of Table 11 shows corresponding regression results. As the estimates in columns 1 and 2 indicate, our findings are robust to examining such alternative country samples. In unreported regressions, we find that the results are qualitatively similar for various country groups in Europe. Solely with respect to Eastern Europe, we find that the interaction terms of interest loose statistical significance. Further, the coefficients in column 3 and 4 show that the results are similar when only manufacturing firms are examined and when utility firms are excluded.
As mentioned in Section 3.4, we carefully check whether our results are robust to applying alternative matching procedures in the sampling process. Panel B of Table 11 presents the results from estimating equation (3) using four different sampling approaches. In the first column, we use the full unmatched sample of firms. The remaining columns present the results for samples in which state firms and always private listed firms are matched by size within the same country-industry grouping, country, or industry. The coefficients in all four models are very similar to those reported in Table 4 . In unreported regressions, we also find that the results of the additional analyses remain very similar when we apply no matching or the alternative approaches.
**** Insert Table 11 about here ****
Additional robustness checks
We apply a battery of additional robustness tests and find that our main results from Section 4.1 remain remarkably unaffected by all of these checks. These tests include the following:
1. In order to provide an additional check that endogeneity of state ownership does not undermine our inference, we employ tests in which only the time variation in the state ownership variable is considered (Firth et al., 2012) . To do that, we estimate equation (3) on the subsample of firms in which the state holds more than 5% in at least one year of our investigation period; we exclude the matched non-state firms. This helps us to filter out the potential influence of time invariant omitted factors correlated with state ownership.
2. As state owners' influence could be limited when their holdings are just around 5%, we replace the continuous State variable with dummies indicating state ownership at the 10% or 20% level. We additionally control for ownership concentration among non-state blockholders and the corresponding interaction terms with and .
3. We alternatively compute according to Chen and Chen (2012) or scale all variables by gross PPE as in Erickson and Whited (2012) . We also make sure that our results do not change if we apply the frequently used cash flow measure calculated as the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization.
4. We consider alternative investment measures, which are not limited to adjustments in fixed assets.
Similar to McLean et al. (2012 ), Chen et al. (2014 and Asker et al. (2015) , we estimate regressions in which we use the sum of capex, R&D expenses, and net assets from acquisitions, or the change in total non-current assets as the dependent variable. In this context we also use beginning-of-period non-current assets or total assets as our scaling variable.
5. In the spirit of Benmelech, Bergman, and Seru (2011) and McLean and Zhao (2014), we replace in equation (3) with relative employee growth.
For the sake of brevity, we do not report these results in this article, but are happy to provide the results upon request.
Conclusion
We investigate the relationship between state ownership and corporate investment patterns and test the underlying theoretical channels of influence. To do so, we compare the investment behavior of state-owned and non-state-owned firms, matched primarily on size and industry. Building upon a theoretical model of investment that accounts for agency issues and financial frictions, we develop a scheme of testable predictions, which helps us disentangling the theoretical arguments related to state ownership.
Using a panel of 624 listed European companies corresponding to more than 5,000 observations, we find that state-owned firms invest considerably less and in a way that is significantly less responsive to changes in investment opportunities. This is consistent with the notion that state ownership is associated with inefficient investment. The underlying argument is that government ownership evokes investment policies that are characterized by conservatism and stability-seeking. We do not find that investment inefficiencies arise from state-owned firms' overinvestment into non-value maximizing projects. If this were the case, we would expect government ownership to increase average investment levels and generate an unconditionally positive link between investment and cash flow in state-owned firms. Our data suggests that the positive relation between state ownership and ICFS is restricted to firms that are expected to be capital constrained and external finance dependent. Thus, it seems that state ownership constitutes a source of financial frictions, rather than a mitigating factor. Our findings are remarkably robust with respect to advanced estimation methods that control for multiple sources of endogeneity as well as for measurement errors. We also show that our line of reasoning continues to hold when we consider crisis-related investment reductions and cross-checks of alternative explanations.
This paper offers a new perspective on the real implications of state ownership. It shows that the major peril of government intervention in (European) firms is not that decision makers overspend funds for political and social purposes, but that they become lethargic, excessively conservative and more affected by financial constraints.
A. Variable description
Cash Flow: is operating cash flow (WS item 04860) deflated by beginning-of-period capital.
Capital is defined as net property, plant and equipment. Capital is defined as net property, plant and equipment (WS item 02501).
Leverage: Leverage is total debt (WS item 03255) divided by book equity. Book equity is total common equity.
Political stability: Stability is an index from World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators that measures the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence; higher values correspond to greater political stability.
Predicted Tobin's Q: Predicted is estimated similarly to Campello and Graham (2013), Mortal and Reisel (2013) and Asker et al. (2015) as the predicted value from a regression of Q on Sales growth, return on assets (EBITDA divided by total assets), cash and cash equivalents normalized by total assets, total debt (WS item 03255) normalized by total assets, and Log.TA including year, country, and industry fixed effects.
Privatization: Privatization is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has been fully government-owned, and zero otherwise.
Sales growth: Sales growth is the percentage change in net sales (WS item 01001).
Size: Log (TA) is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets denominated in US$ million.
State ownership: State is the ownership share held by a state entity. The detailed identification procedure and the associated used sources are outlined in Section 3.3.
Stock price informativeness: is calculated in the spirit of Chen et al. (2007) and Jiang et al. (2011) to reflect the firm-specific component in stock return variation. Specifically, is estimated in each year as 1-R 2 from following regression: , = + ,1 , , −1 + ,2 , , + ,1 , , +1 + , .
Here, , is the stock return of firm i in week t and , , is the domestic market return in country j in week t. We allow for non-synchronous trading by including lead and lag terms for the market index returns. We exclude firm years in which the stock trades for less than 26 weeks.
Tobin's Q: is calculated as the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Market value of assets is defined as total assets (WS item 02999) plus total market capitalization (WS item 08002) minus book equity. Book value of assets equals total assets. Book equity is total common equity (WS item 03501).
Uncertainty: Volatility is the yearly volatility of weekly stock price returns. We exclude firm years in which the stock trades for less than 26 weeks.
B. Agency problems and investment-q sensitivity
In this section, we show how agency conflicts lead to reduced investment-q sensitivity. In the absence of financial frictions, when θ is zero, the investment rule is:
We define fundamental investment opportunities as = /(1 + ) and the additional marginal value of investment perceived by decision makers as = /(1 + ) . We follow the convention (Hayashi, 1982) and assume the following quadratic form for the adjustment cost function ( ):
where is a firm-specific parameter and is a technology shock. Substituting equation (5) in equation (4) yields the following investment specification:
where = 1/ . The investment sensitivity to q can be written as follows:
If the second term on the right-hand side is zero, investment-sensitivity is not distorted.
However, there are good reasons to assume that this term will in fact be negative. If we assume that does not directly depend on but has decreasing returns to scale, so < 0, we can write equation (7) as:
With ( ⁄ ) ⁄ < 0 , the right-hand side term is smaller than , which represents the investment-sensitivity in the absence of agency issues. One can think of many situations in which the marginal additionally perceived value of investment is decreasing in the level of investment. First, in the context of private benefits of investment, it is common to assume that the insiders' utility of private consumption is an increasing and concave function. Second, the risk of (minority) shareholder intervention rises with increasing levels of investment, reducing the marginal additional value of investment to decision makers. Third, in the context of private costs of investment, it is fair to assume that these costs might increase exponentially. In general, it is also conceivable that there is a direct relation between and , in the sense that individually perceived marginal value of investment is higher when fundamental is low or decreasing.
Borisova, G., Fotak, V., Holland, K., Megginson, W. L., 2015 . Government ownership and the cost of debt: Evidence (3) in which is the dependent variable. The regressions are estimated separately for subsamples of firms formed on the basis of financial constraints measured at the end of the previous period. The subsamples comprise firms with financial constraint measures below and above the yearly sample median. The Whited-Wu index is calculated according to Whited and Wu (2006) . Payout ratio is total dividends divided by cash flow. Size refers to net sales in US$ million. External finance dependence is measured as the percentage of observations on the firm for which investment is greater than operating cash flow. The set of control variables includes the same as in Table 4 . All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. P-values at the bottom indicate whether coefficients are significantly different between the respective subsamples. Associated t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the l%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Whited and Wu (2006) . Payout ratio is total dividends divided by cash flow. Size refers to net sales in US$ million. External finance dependence is measured as the percentage of observations on the firm for which investment is greater than operating cash flow. The set of control variables includes the same as in Table 4 and Dividends. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Industries are defined as the 12 Fama-French industry groups. R-squared refers to pseudo R-squared for the probit models. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Associated t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the l%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Erickson et al. (2014) , using four orders of cumulants.
In column 4, we estimate the equation in differences by removing firm-specific means from observable regression variables. The set of control variables includes the same as in Table 4 . All variables are defined in the Appendix. Industries are defined as the 12 Fama-French industry groups.
2 is an estimate of R-squared. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, and clustered at the firm level in Panel A. Associated t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the l%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. ) and its interaction with . Column 5 includes a dummy variable (Tang. high) that indicates whether the ratio of PPE to total assets is above the yearly sample median. Column 6 includes a dummy variable (Uncert. high) that indicates whether Volatility is above the annual sample median. The set of control variables includes the same as in Table 4 .
All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Associated t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the l%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
